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CORPORATE TAX GAMES WITH CROSS-BORDER EXTERNALITIES
FROM PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE
GERDA DEWIT, KATE HYNES and DERMOT LEAHY
We construct a model of corporate tax competition in which governments also use
public infrastructure investment to attract foreign direct investment, thus enhancing
their tax bases. In doing so, we allow for cross-border infrastructural externalities.
Depending on the externality, governments are shown to strategically over- or under-
invest in infrastructure. We also examine how tax cooperation influences investment in
infrastructure and find that welfare may be lower under tax cooperation than under tax
competition; this is the case when infrastructure is very effective in raising the tax base
and generates a large negative cross-border externality. (JEL F23, H40)
I. INTRODUCTION
As economic globalization deepens, coun-
tries tend to compete fiercely with each other
to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), often
using favorable tax rates. This is evident both
from the often heated political debate on cor-
porate taxes1 and has also been emphasized by
the vast academic literature on tax competition.
While the tax rate in the prospective host location
matters for a firm’s location decision, its actual
location choice typically hinges on a combina-
tion of host location characteristics, among which
infrastructure plays a prominent role (as shown
by Brakman, Garretsen, and van Marrewijk 2002
and suggested in earlier theoretical work, e.g.,
Taylor 1992).2
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1. The debate on tax competition also often features in
the press (e.g., “Heard that countries should compete on tax?
Wrong,” The Guardian, April 18, 2013).
2. Recent empirical work (e.g., Hauptmeier, Mittermaier,
and Rincke 2012; Winner 2012) confirms that governments
compete for mobile capital choosing a multidimensional pol-
icy package, consisting not only of a strategically chosen tax
rate, but also of a strategically chosen level of productive pub-
lic inputs.
In this article, we focus on the role of public
infrastructure when there is tax competition. In
doing so, we address two questions. First, we
examine how governments’ investment decisions
in public infrastructure interact with their policy
of corporate taxation. Second, as the possibility
of tax harmonization has been on the political
agenda for a long time now and seems even more
pressing as globalization deepens, we explore
how tax harmonization between two competing
host countries affects those countries’ investment
in public infrastructure and their welfare.
Our article relates to three different strands in
the literature. First and foremost, it fits in the liter-
ature that deals with competition for international
firms. The bulk of this literature is concerned
with tax competition. Following the theoretical
work of Wilson (1986), empirical work provides
strong evidence for tax competition between
jurisdictions (e.g., Devereux, Lockwood, and
Redoano 2008).3 Other work—albeit smaller in
volume—has focused on infrastructural or public
goods-related competition between jurisdictions
to attract foreign firms and argues that this may
lead to an overprovision of public goods.4 More
3. Recent surveys on tax competition include Zodrow
(2010) and Baskaran and Lopes da Fonseca (2013).
4. Examples are Taylor (1992), Bayindir-Upmann
(1998), Bucovetsky (2005), and Egger and Falkinger (2006).
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recent work examines the link between tax rates
and the provision of public goods when countries
use both these policy instruments to compete for
FDI. Notable examples of theoretical work are
Zissimos and Wooders (2008), Hindriks, Peralta,
and Weber (2008), Dembour and Wauthy (2009),
and Pieretti and Zanaj (2011).5 Empirical work
addressing the joint impact of tax rates and pub-
lic inputs as determinants for attracting foreign
firms is still small but growing. Bénassy-Quéré,
Gobalraja, and Trannoy (2007) conclude that
both the corporate tax rates and the public capital
stock mattered for FDI by American firms into
European countries. Görg, Molana, and Mon-
tagna (2009) use Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) data
and find that high corporate tax rates do not
necessarily dampen FDI if associated with the
provision of public goods that improve the eco-
nomic environment in which multinational firms
operate.6 Recent empirical work provides direct
evidence that governments are using public
infrastructure together with corporate tax rates
to attract mobile capital. This includes Gomes
and Pouget (2008), who show that corporate tax
rates and public investment are endogenous and
also find evidence for international competition
in both policy instruments. In a study that looks
at German regions, Hauptmeier, Mittermaier,
and Rincke (2012) focus on the strategic interac-
tion between governments that not only choose
corporate tax rates but also public inputs. They
find that not only the strategic interaction effect
between jurisdictions is significantly positive for
tax rates, but also the direct interaction effect
between jurisdictions is statistically different
from zero for public input provision. In fact, it
tends to be even larger than the direct interaction
effect in taxes capital. These studies point to
the deliberate use of both tax rates and public
infrastructure provision to attract mobile capital.
Second, our model contributes to the literature
on cross-border effects of public infrastructure.
The nature of the externalities and in particular
whether they are beneficial or harmful to neigh-
boring countries or regions, depends both on
the specific regions involved as well as on the
5. The setup in these papers is closest to the framework
used in our article. There are, however, important differences
between our article and these studies, which will be discussed
when we elaborate on the specific contributions of our analy-
sis.
6. See Chen et al. (2014) for an extension and updated
version of this empirical study.
type of public infrastructure. From a theoretical
point of view, given two jurisdictions’ relative
attractiveness, infrastructure investment in one
of the jurisdictions makes it more attractive to
multinational firms and hence potentially has a
“business-stealing” effect on the other region.
Even if the investment in infrastructure in one
region is not just local in that it connects its trans-
port or telecommunications network to those in
the other region, the latter does not necessarily
benefit from that investment. Martin and Rogers
(1995) distinguish between a country’s invest-
ment in domestic and international infrastructure
in a theoretical model without tax competition
and emphasize the different effects of the two
types of public infrastructure for firm location.
Surveying the empirical evidence, Puga (2008)
concludes that infrastructure investment projects
generate externalities that may diffuse over wide
geographical areas. Boarnet (1998) and Moreno
and López-Bazo (2003) find evidence of public
infrastructural investment having harmful effects
on surrounding regions for Canada and Spain,
respectively. By contrast, Cohen and Morri-
son Paul (2003) and Cohen and Morrison Paul
(2003, 2004) present evidence of positive spa-
tial spillovers of public infrastructure between
U.S. states.7 Yu et al. (2012) present evidence
for China, suggesting that public infrastructure
spillovers are positive between some regions,
negative between others, and zero for yet other
regions. Naturally, cross-border externalities
are also relevant across nations. Consider, for
instance, how ports and airports in one country
will affect other countries (see Dembour and
Wauthy 2009).8 In short, the empirical litera-
ture offers evidence for negative and positive
cross-border spillovers of public infrastructure
investment.
Third, our work is also related to the literature
on globalization and public spending. There is a
growing literature that, contrary to conventional
wisdom, globalization does not necessarily imply
that public spending will fall. Rodrik (1998) pro-
vides empirical evidence for a positive relation-
ship between the degree of openness of a country
7. More specifically, they found that hub airport expan-
sion has a significant direct cost savings effect on own-state
manufacturing production, and a roughly equal indirect cost
effect on manufacturing industries in other states.
8. In a recent study aimed at determining cross-border
spillovers from European gas infrastructure investment,
Bouwmeester and Scholtens (2017) found that there were sig-
nificant positive cross-border spillovers when countries invest
in gas transmission infrastructure.
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and the size of its government.9 Our paper shows
that the footlooseness of multinational firms does
not necessarily imply a low level of public infra-
structure investment.10 If governments invest in
public infrastructure to attract mobile capital,
this could result in an overprovision of those
types of infrastructure that are of most inter-
est to mobile firms with possible ramifications
for public spending geared toward immobile
residents. This potential side effect of using
public infrastructure to attract mobile capital was
predicted in the theoretical literature by Keen
and Marchand (1997). In their words, “Crudely
put, the picture that emerges is thus one in which
fiscal competition leads to too many business
centres and airports but not enough parks and
libraries.”11 More recently, Winner (2012) finds
evidence for just such a bias in the composition
of public spending. Specifically, he examines
whether infrastructural competition affects the
composition of public spending, using data from
18 OECD economies (from 1980 to 2000). He
provides support for the hypothesis that infra-
structural competition will affect the composition
of public spending and cause a shift from resi-
dential public goods to industrial public inputs,
where the former benefit immobile residents and
the latter benefit mobile production factors.
In this article, we characterize government
strategies to attract footloose capital, taking into
account the interdependence between corporate
taxes and public infrastructure investment. Our
model considers two jurisdictions, which com-
pete for foreign firms in a two-stage game: they
commit to public infrastructure levels in stage
1—which captures the long-term nature of this
investment decision—and compete for FDI with
corporate taxes in stage 2.
Our analysis is different in various respects
from previous works and contributes to the afore-
mentioned literature in several ways. First, unlike
the setup in these papers, our framework allows
for positive and negative cross-border spillovers
from public infrastructure.12
9. Consistent with this observation, Alesina and Wacziarg
(1998) show that smaller countries that are more open to
trade also have a larger share of public consumption in gross
domestic product.
10. This resonates with the findings on the relationship
between corporate tax rates and the provision of public goods
in Görg, Molana, and Montagna (2009).
11. Other theoretical work confirmed this prediction (see
Cremer et al. 1997 for an overview).
12. Zissimos and Wooders (2008), Hindriks, Peralta,
and Weber (2008), and Pieretti and Zanaj (2011) examine
Second, our model captures the fact that the
game that countries play is rarely a zero-sum
one: competing for business with lower taxes
or higher infrastructure can be expected to lead
to an increase in the total pool of FDI and to
enhance the combined tax base of the competing
countries.13 This modeling innovation is likely to
be relevant for future empirical work that aims to
measure the success of policy packages designed
to attract FDI. Also important in this respect
is that our work generalizes the model beyond
specific functional forms.
Third, we examine a form of tax harmoniza-
tion that should not just eliminate the harmful
race-to-the-bottom in tax rates but allows simi-
lar countries to set their taxes to maximize joint
welfare. Previous work has not examined actual
tax cooperation.14 We show that, even when tax
rates are cooperatively set by countries that are
symmetric, welfare with tax harmonization may
fall below welfare with tax competition.
Section II presents the building blocks of
our framework. In Section III, we solve a sim-
ple model that captures the essence of our
results. In Section IV, we move beyond the
specific functional forms used in Section III to
generalize our results and formalize them in
propositions. In Section V, we discuss the wel-
fare effects of tax harmonization when countries
are symmetric. Section VI considers a number
of extensions of our model such as asymmet-
ric countries, an alternative move order, more
than two jurisdictions, and a discussion of the
effect of minimum tax rates as an alternative
form of tax harmonization. Section VII presents
the conclusion.
II. THE MODEL SETUP
Consider two jurisdictions, “Home” and “For-
eign” (denoted by H and F, respectively), which
are both prospective host locations for multi-
national firms from other countries. The juris-
dictions can be different countries or different
extremely negative externalities only, while Dembour and
Wauthy (2009) only look at positive spatial spillovers.
13. Previous models of competition for firms typically
model that competition using a Hotelling type setup, implying
that the pool of possible foreign direct investment is fixed and
the game prospective host countries play is a zero-sum game.
14. While some papers consider tax harmonization in
the sense of a minimum tax rate or split-the-difference tax
rate (Zissimos and Wooders 2008), others examine fiscal
equalization schemes (Hindriks, Peralta, and Weber 2008) or
cooperation in infrastructure (Dembour and Wauthy 2009).
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regions of the same country with independent tax
raising authority as well as public infrastructure
decision making power, but throughout the model
we will refer to these jurisdictions as “countries.”
The two countries compete for third-country FDI
as this generates benefits for each. One obvious
benefit is the tax revenue that the government
collects from multinationals. Naturally, these tax
revenues increase in the actual amount of FDI
attracted into the country. One way to increase
the amount of FDI a country attracts is to lower
its corporate tax rate, which in turn will raise the
country’s tax base. An increase in public infras-
tructure investment also increases the amount of
FDI a country attracts, and, in addition, it raises
the profits of the multinational plants that had
already decided to locate in the country involved.
Both effects of public infrastructure work toward
increasing the country’s tax base.
Tax revenues from multinationals located in
H are represented by tB, where t ∈ [0, 1] is H’s
profit tax rate and B denotes the aggregate pre-
tax profits of multinational firms located in H.
For brevity, we will refer to B as H’s (multi-
national) tax base and B* as F’s (multinational)
tax base. These mobile tax base functions can be
written as:
(1a) B = B
(
t, t∗, x, x∗
)
,
and
(1b) B∗ = B∗
(
t, t∗, x, x∗
)
.
We assume B= 0 at t= 1 and B* = 0 if t* = 1.
Also, we assume Bt < 0, where subscripts here
and elsewhere denote partial derivatives. This
captures the idea that a higher tax rate reduces
the tax base as it reduces the inward FDI into
H. We have Bt∗ > 0 because the countries are
substitute locations for multinational investment.
The partial derivatives of B* are analogous. Local
infrastructure can be expected to both make a
location more attractive for multinational invest-
ment and to raise the profitability at that location.
Since both of these effects work toward raising
the aggregate pretax profits of multinationals in
the region that invests in public infrastructure,
Bx > 0 and B
∗
x∗ > 0. Signing the cross effects, Bx∗
and B∗x , is less straightforward as these depend on
whether the externality that one country’s public
infrastructure investment generates for the other
is negative or positive. A rival host country’s
investment in public infrastructure may reduce a
country’s relative attractiveness to multination-
als and therefore its multinational tax base. This
could, for instance, be the case when the rival host
location invests in education. However, some
types of public infrastructure investment could
be beneficial to countries other than the investing
country itself. For example, a country’s invest-
ment in a major local port may increase the attrac-
tiveness of other nearby prospective host coun-
tries as well. In that case, the investment in public
infrastructure by one country entails a positive
cross-border externality to the nearby country.
We define the ratios λ (t, t∗, x, x∗) ≡ B∗x∕Bx and
λ∗ (t, t∗, x, x∗) ≡ Bx∗∕B∗x∗ ; λ> 0 implies that the
externality is positive (B∗x > 0), while λ< 0 indi-
cates the externality is negative (B∗x < 0).
15We
assume −1≤ λ≤ 1 and −1≤ λ* ≤ 1, which
implies that the effect of a country’s infrastruc-
tural investment is always at least as strong on
the own country as its effect—whether positive
or negative—on the competing country.
Welfare for H and F, respectively, is given by:
(2a) W
(
t, t∗, x, x∗
)
= tB
(
t, t∗, x, x∗
)
− Ω (x)
and
(2b)
W∗
(
t, t∗, x, x∗
)
= t∗B∗
(
t, t∗, x, x∗
)
− Ω∗
(
x∗
)
where Ω(x) and Ω*(x*) stand for the costs of
infrastructural investment in H and F, respec-
tively. We assume that these are increasing con-
vex functions of public infrastructure (Ω′′ (x)> 0
and Ω*′′ (x*)> 0).
In addition to improving the local business
environment for inward FDI, public infrastruc-
ture clearly has many direct social and economic
benefits. Furthermore, FDI, apart from gener-
ating tax revenue, can also provide many other
benefits, and in some cases costs, to a country.
For instance, it can affect the activity of domestic
firms. We do not include taxes from domestic
firms in tB, because, although they contribute to
the general tax base, they do not contribute to the
multinational tax base.16 However, there might
be other good reasons to include the activity of
15. Naturally, it is possible that Bx∗ ≤ 0 while B
∗
x ≥ 0 and
vice versa.
16. The tax revenue from domestic firms comes from
domestic profits and earnings and represents a transfer
between agents within the country. By contrast, tax revenue
from multinational firms (captured by tB) is rent extracted
from foreigners and is a net addition to welfare. Thus, it is
important to disentangle the two.
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domestic firms in the welfare function.17 The
effect of FDI on domestic firms could vary in
sign depending on whether foreign firms benefit
or hurt domestic firm activity. Thus, an increase
in FDI could stimulate some domestic firms
(for instance, inward FDI may generate tech-
nological spillovers to some domestic firms),
while crowding out others.18 Furthermore, there
may be beneficial interaction effects between
public infrastructure and FDI; for instance, a
more developed public infrastructure may allow
a country to benefit to a greater extent from any
spillovers from inward FDI.19
To take account of the effects on domestic
business activity and other social effects, we will
introduce an “additional benefit function” that
captures all of the economic and social effects
of public infrastructure and FDI that are not
included in the revenue from the taxation of
multinationals (tB and t*B*). We will represent
these additional benefits to Home and Foreign
by g and g*, respectively, and assume that g(x,
t, k) is increasing in Home infrastructure, x, and
decreasing in t as higher taxes would reduce
domestic firm activity. Inward FDI, denoted by k,
could have overall positive or negative effects on
g as discussed above. Inward FDI is decreasing
in t and increasing in t* and x. The volume of
FDI may also depend on x*, though the sign is
ambiguous. Taking all these effects into account,
we can write the nontax benefits of inward FDI
and public infrastructure in compact form as
G(t, t*, x, x*)= g[k(t, t*, x, x*), x, t] and
G*(t, t*, x, x*)= g*[k(t, t*, x, x*), x*, t*] for
Home and Foreign, respectively. Including
these benefits into expressions (2a) and (2b)
gives us the enhanced welfare functions for
the respective countries. The sign of the partial
derivatives of G(t, t*, x, x*) will be affected by
that of gk. In the case in which this is positive,
implying that an increase in FDI has positive
additional benefits on the domestic country, we
get Gt < 0, Gt∗ > 0, Gx > 0, and Gx∗ ambiguous.
If gk is negative, due perhaps to the crowding
17. For instance, the government may be concerned with
the employment they provide or their contribution to export
earnings. Thus, the activity of domestic firms could enter the
welfare function directly. We would expect the direct effect of
the tax on domestic firms to be negative, while the direct effect
of local public infrastructure would be positive for domestic
firms.
18. On possible crowding out effects of FDI, see, for
instance, Aitkin and Harrison (1999) and Jude (2015).
19. A report by the OECD () points to the importance of
policies that maximize the benefits from FDI, especially for
newly emerging and developing economies.
out of domestic firms, then some of these signs
could be reversed (we will return to this in
subsection IV.A). The partial derivatives of
G*(t, t*, x, x*) are analogous. Throughout
our analysis, we will use the welfare func-
tions in expressions (2a) and (2b), but will
point out briefly when and how our qualitative
results would change if the enhanced welfare
expressions were used.
We will consider two two-stage games. In
one game, jurisdictions choose taxes nonco-
operatively; in the other, they set tax rates
cooperatively. In the first stage of each game,
governments simultaneously choose investment
levels in public infrastructure and subsequently,
in the second stage, they set corporate tax rates.
We solve each game by backward induction. The
move order is based on the fact that infrastructure
investment typically has more commitment value
than taxes as it involves a long-run decision and
is to a large extent irreversible.20
We first solve a specific case of our model, in
which we use a linear function for each region’s
multinational tax base and a quadratic function
for the regional cost of public infrastructure
investment. The use of these special functional
forms allows us to side step the technicalities
involved in solving the general model and thus
present our results in as transparent a way
as possible. We will refer to this case as the
“linear–quadratic” (LQ) case. Subsequently, we
generalize the model and formulate our results
in propositions.
III. THE LINEAR–QUADRATIC CASE
In the LQ case, the multinational tax bases in
H and F are, respectively, given by:
(3a) B = α − β
(
t − ϵt∗
)
+ γ
(
x + λx∗
)
and
20. We have followed the standard practice in assuming
that infrastructure is chosen before the taxes (see among other
Zissimos and Wooders 2008 and Pieretti and Zanaj 2011).
The reason for the widespread preference for this assumption
about the move order is that public infrastructure, which takes
time to build, is seen as more difficult to change than taxes. In
another part of the multistage game theory literature this is the
reason why in capacity and price games firms are modeled as
choosing capacity first and then price (e.g., the very influential
paper by Kreps and Scheinkman 1983). In their model, price
is seen as easier to change than capacity. So we assume that
governments set infrastructure first as this variable has more
commitment value than the corporate tax rate because of its
innate irreversibility.
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(3b) B∗ = α − β
(
t∗ − ϵt
)
+ γ
(
x∗ + λx
)
.
In expressions (3a) and (3b), α, β, and γ are
positive, 0< ϵ< 1 and−1≤ λ≤ 1, so that the sign
of the partial derivatives of B and B* are as
discussed in the previous section.21 The respec-
tive public infrastructure investment cost func-
tions for H and F are, respectively, given by
Ω(x)= (ω/2)x2 andΩ*(x*)= (ω/2)x*2, with ω> 0.
As indicated by our expressions, we assume for
now that the two countries are completely sym-
metric. We examine the effect of asymmetry
between the countries in Section VI.
A. Tax Competition
First consider the game in which taxes are
set noncooperatively.
Stage 2: Noncooperative Tax Setting. The gov-
ernments simultaneously and noncooperatively
choose taxes given infrastructural investment lev-
els x and x*. The Home government maximizes
Home welfare with respect to t, which yields its
tax reaction function, t=ψ(t*;x, x*):
t = ψ
(
t∗; x, x∗
)
=
(
α + γ
(
x + λx∗
))
∕2β(4)
+ (ϵ∕2) t∗.
The tax reaction function for the Foreign gov-
ernment is analogous. From expression (4), we
can see that taxes are strategic complements.
The tax reaction functions shift outward in the
country’s own public infrastructure investment
and in the competing country’s public infra-
structure investment if the latter generates a pos-
itive externality.
The equilibrium tax rate for Home, denoted by
tN , is:
tN = [(2 + ϵ) α] ∕
[
β
(
4 − ϵ2
)](5)
+ γ
[
(2 + ϵλ) x + (2λ + ϵ) x∗
]
∕
[
β
(
4 − ϵ2
)]
.
21. These functional forms allow us to move beyond the
Hotelling case, used in earlier work. The standard Hotel-
ing case implies a fixed pool of FDI. By contrast, in our
setup multinational firms—as indeed they do in the real
world—have an outside option such as producing in other
locations and serving a market from a distance by exporting.
What is more, the Hotelling model restricts λ to −1, which
implies a complete and negative cross-border spillover. By
contrast, the functional forms used here allow us to examine
different types and levels of the externality and assess how
beneficial cooperation is in those different scenarios. This is
useful, given that, empirically, the externality seems to depend
on the type of infrastructure and features of the jurisdictions.
Given symmetry, the equilibrium tax rate in
Foreign, t*N , takes the same form with the role
of x and x* reversed.
Let us now examine how investment in pub-
lic infrastructure affects equilibrium tax rates. A
country’s tax rate is always increasing in its own
investment in public infrastructure (dtN /dx> 0
from expression (5)). The effect of a country’s
investment in public infrastructure on the other
host country’s corporate tax rate (dtN /dx*) is
ambiguous and depends on the externality on
the rival host country. When a country’s infra-
structure investment generates a positive or not
too negative externality for the rival host coun-
try (i.e., λ > λ ≡ −ϵ∕2), it raises the latter’s tax
rate, but the opposite is true when the exter-
nality is negative and sufficiently strong (i.e.,
λ < λ ≡ −ϵ∕2).
Stage 1: Investment in Public Infrastructure
under Tax Competition. We now determine each
country’s optimal investment level in infrastruc-
ture. For ease of exposition, we focus on H’s
choice. F’s choice of investment is completely
analogous. Home maximizes welfare with
respect to x, taking tN = tN(x, x*) (see expression
(5)) and t*N = t*N(x, x*) into account. This yields
the first-order condition for x:
dW∕dx = Wx +Wt
(
dtN∕dx
)
(6)
+Wt∗
(
dt∗N∕dx
)
= 0.
Using the envelope theorem, Wt = 0 from
the second stage. When discussing expression
(6), it proves helpful to use the “strategic invest-
ment” terminology pioneered by Fudenberg and
Tirole (1984). The first term in expression (6)
is the direct effect of x on Home welfare, with
Wx = tγ−ωx. Let us focus on this term first. If
governments were to choose public infrastructure
investment simultaneously to setting taxes, H
would choose x such that Wx = 0, implying that
the marginal direct benefits of public infrastruc-
ture investment would be equal to its marginal
costs (i.e., tγ=ωx). We will henceforth refer to
this hypothetical case, in which Wx = 0, as the
“nonstrategic simultaneous-move benchmark.”
The last term in expression (6) is the “strate-
gic” term (Wt∗
(
dt∗N∕dx
)
). The sign of this
term determines whether the Home government
will—in the terminology of Fudenberg and
Tirole (1984)—“over-” or “under” invest, rela-
tive to the hypothetical nonstrategic benchmark,
in order to manipulate the tax rates set in the
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rival jurisdiction. If the strategic term is positive,
then the first term in expression (6) has to be
negative (Wx < 0) and we say that the Home
government “over” invests in public infrastruc-
ture relative to the nonstrategic benchmark. It is
important to stress that by overinvestment, we
certainly do not mean unproductive investment.
In our model, all the infrastructural investment is
productive in raising the multinational tax base.
Investment in infrastructure raises the tax base
directly; in some circumstances it raises the other
jurisdiction’s optimal tax rate. When it does, the
marginal benefit of infrastructural investment is
increased and the optimal level is higher than it
would be in the nonstrategic simultaneous-move
benchmark. If the strategic term is negative,
then the opposite holds (Wx > 0) and the govern-
ment “under” invests relative to the nonstrategic
benchmark.
To determine which of these cases will occur,
we need to examine the strategic term in detail.
The term can be decomposed into Wt∗ and
dt*N /dx. We have Wt∗ = tβϵ > 0, implying that
the Foreign tax rate is “friendly,” which means
that a rise in Foreign’s tax rate increases Home
welfare.22 The sign of the strategic term there-
fore depends on the sign of dt*N /dx, which, as
shown earlier, depends on the sign of 2λ+ ϵ.
So, if λ is above the threshold λ = −ϵ∕2 (hence,
dt*N /dx> 0), then Home will “over” invest
in public infrastructure (Wt∗
(
dt∗N∕dx
)
> 0,
hence Wx < 0). However, when λ < λ = −ϵ∕2,
it will “under” invest (Wt∗
(
dt∗N∕dx
)
< 0, hence
Wx > 0).
Intuitively, governments wish to avoid a race
to the bottom in corporate tax rates and will act
strategically when choosing their investment lev-
els in public infrastructure. When a country’s
investment in public infrastructure raises the rival
host country’s tax rate, it will choose to increase
its investment, as a high tax rate in the rival host
country will allow the investing country to set
a high tax rate itself. When its investment does
the opposite, the investing country will avoid
low tax rates by limiting its investment in pub-
lic infrastructure.
The equilibrium level of public infrastructure
investment in H is:
(7) xN =
[
2ηα (2 + ϵλ)
]
∕DN
22. Brander (1995) was the first to refer to this type of
cross derivative as the “friendliness” term.
with DN ≡ γ[β(2−ϵ)(4−ϵ2)− 2η(1+λ)(2+ϵλ)]
> 0, where η≡ γ2/ω is a measure of the relative
effectiveness of public infrastructure investment.
B. Tax Cooperation
Here, we continue to assume that countries
choosing their public infrastructure investment
levels, x and x*, in stage 1, do so independently.
However, the tax rate, set in stage 2, is now com-
mon. We will assume that the governments can
set the harmonized tax at the jointly optimal level
given the infrastructure levels set in stage 1. We
have chosen to model tax harmonization as tax
cooperation as it would be expected to be more
favorable than any other forms of tax harmoniza-
tion. Our analysis thus provides us with a first rule
of thumb for assessing the success of tax harmo-
nization initiatives: if the conditions are such that
even actual tax cooperation reduces welfare of
the countries involved, the prospects for finding
a simple welfare improving form of tax harmo-
nization would seem very remote.23
Using expression (3a) and setting t= t* =τ,
the expression for the multinational tax base in
Home is now given by:
(8) B = α − β (1 − ϵ) τ + γ
(
x + λx∗
)
.
The common tax rate is chosen to maximize
the sum of Home and Foreign welfare, W +W*,
taking account of the fact that, at this stage, public
infrastructure has already been chosen. The first-
order condition for the jointly optimal tax rate is:
(9) Wτ +W∗τ = τ
(
Bτ + B∗τ
)
+ B + B∗ = 0,
implying that the common tax rate under tax
cooperation is given by:
(10) τC =
2α + γ (1 + λ) (x + x∗)
4β (1 − ϵ)
.
Investment in public infrastructure in either
country (weakly) raises the common tax rate
(dτC/dx= dτC/dx* =γ(1+λ)/[4β(1−ϵ)]≥ 0)24.
In stage 1, Home and Foreign choose their
public infrastructure investment levels noncoop-
eratively, taking account of the effect on the
23. We discuss another form of tax harmonization in
Section VI.
24. We assume ϵ< 1 to ensure an interior cooperative
optimum. This captures the stylized fact that as the cooper-
ative tax rises it negatively influences the tax base. Note that
in the standard Hotelling case, ϵ= 1 and the cooperative (joint
optimal) tax would be confiscatory.
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future cooperatively set corporate tax. The first-
order condition for Home welfare maximization
with respect to infrastructural investment is:
(11) Wx +Wτ
(
dτC∕dx
)
= 0
with Wx =γτ−ωx and Wτ =B−β(1−ϵ)τ. The
first-order condition for Foreign welfare max-
imization is similar. As dτC/dx= dτC/dx* > 0,
the sign of the strategic term in expression (11)
depends on the friendliness term, Wτ. As expres-
sion (9) can, given symmetry, be rewritten as
Wτ +W∗τ = 2Wτ = 0, it implies Wτ = 0. This
means that the strategic term in expressions (11)
vanishes and hence neither country invests strate-
gically. As expression (11) reduces to Wx = 0
and with τC given by expression (10), optimal
public infrastructure investment levels under tax
cooperation (denoted by xC and x*C), are then
given by:
(12) xC = x∗C = ηα∕DC
with DC =γ[2β(1−ϵ)−η(1+λ)]> 0 to guaran-
tee stability.
In Figure 1 we depict the first-order conditions
for infrastructure and taxes in symmetric (x,t)-
space; these are drawn for tax competition (xN(t)
and tN(x)) and for tax cooperation (xC(τ) and
τC(x)). In both Figures 1A and B, the equilibrium
under tax competition is indicated by point N and
the equilibrium under tax cooperation by point C.
Figure 1A illustrates the two equilibria for λ > λ,
while Figure 1B does so when λ < λ.
Before discussing the welfare effects of
tax cooperation, we will generalize the model
in the next section and formulate our results
in propositions.
IV. THE GENERAL MODEL
In this section, we generalize our results
obtained for the LQ case. For this purpose,
we use the general function forms specified in
Section II and unless otherwise stated we do not
impose symmetry. The purpose of this section
is to explore the robustness of our model. With
linear functional forms taxes are strategic com-
plements and the threshold level of externality
below which countries strategically underinvest
in infrastructure to reduce the rival’s taxes is
negative. We extend the analysis by allowing
for the possibility that taxes could be strategic
substitutes rather than complements and study
how this affects the critical threshold. We show
that the sign of the threshold depends on whether
taxes are strategic substitutes or complements.
A. Tax Competition
Again, we first consider the game in which
taxes are set noncooperatively.
Stage 2: Noncooperative Tax Setting. In stage
2, governments simultaneously and noncoopera-
tively choose taxes, given infrastructural invest-
ment levels x and x*, to maximize expressions
(2a) and (2b). First-order conditions associated
with welfare maximization, Wt(t, t
*, x, x*)= 0 for
H and W∗t∗ (t
∗, t, x∗, x) = 0 for F, yield H’s and F’s
tax reaction functions, given by t=ψ(t*;x, x*) and
t* =ψ*(t;x, x*), respectively.
Let us now examine the properties of these
reaction functions. The slope of H’s tax best
response functions is given by ψt∗ = −Wtt∗∕Wtt.
As the second-order conditions require Wtt < 0,
the sign of ψt∗ is the same as that of Wtt∗ , with
Wtt∗ = Bt∗ + tBtt∗ . The term Bt∗ is positive and
so works toward Wtt∗ and ψt∗ being positive.
The intuition is that an increase in the tax in F
makes H a relatively attractive location and, since
this increases Home’s tax base, it works toward
raising the marginal benefit of the tax. The sign
of tBtt∗ is ambiguous. However, provided that this
term is not too negative, the tax best-response
functions are positively sloped and corporate tax
rates are strategic complements. One can think
of this as the “normal case,” which is guaranteed
in the LQ case but not in general. The following
assumption ensures that the cross effects, Wtt∗
and W∗t∗t, do not dominate the direct effects, Wtt
and W∗t∗t∗ , and guarantees the stability of the tax
game:
ASSUMPTION 1. ||Wtt|| > ||Wtt∗ || and|||W∗t∗t∗ ||| > |||W∗t∗t|||.
We now examine the impact of investment in
public infrastructure on the reaction functions.
Investment in public infrastructure causes them to
shift. The impact on H’s reaction function is cap-
tured by ψx =−Wtx/Wtt and, similarly, by ψx∗ =
−Wtx∗∕Wtt. As we have Wt =B+ tBt = 0, and
hence t=−B/Bt, we can rewrite Wtx =Bx + tBtx
as Wtx =Bx −Btx(B/Bt). Similarly, we can
rewrite Wtx∗ = Bx∗ + tBtx∗ as Bx∗ − Btx∗
(
B∕Bt
)
.
Defining R≡ 1− (B/Bt)(Btx/Bx) and r ≡
1 −
(
B∕Bt
) (
Btx∗∕Bx∗
)
, we can write Wtx =RBx
and Wtx∗ = rBx∗ . Let R* and r* be analogously
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FIGURE 1
First-Order Conditions under Tax Competition and Tax Cooperation—The Symmetric
Linear–Quadratic Case. (A) λ > λ, (B) λ < λ
(A)  λ > λ
_
(B)  λ < λ
_
defined for the Foreign jurisdiction. We will
assume that the following reasonable restriction
holds:
ASSUMPTION 2. R> 0, r> 0, R* > 0 and
r* > 0.
This condition is guaranteed to hold in many
special cases including the LQ case discussed in
the previous section. R> 0 implies that the tax
elasticity of the region’s multinational tax base
(−Bt(t/B)) is decreasing in public infrastructure
investment.25 The idea here is that inflows of FDI
become less sensitive to corporate taxes when the
region is more attractive because of higher infra-
structural provision. Likewise, r> 0 implies that,
if F’s investment makes H’s location less attrac-
tive on infrastructural grounds, then H’s multina-
tional tax base becomes more sensitive to taxes.26
From Assumption 2, ψx > 0. The sign of ψx∗ ,
which captures the cross effect of Foreign’s pub-
lic infrastructure on Home’s tax reaction func-
tion, depends on that of Bx∗ and is therefore
ambiguous. We assume that the absolute impact
of own investment on the own tax reaction func-
tion is at least as large as its impact on the rival
reaction function, or:
25. That is, − ∂(Btt/B)/∂x= tBtBxR/B2 < 0. This implies
R> 0 as Bt < 0 and Bx > 0.
26. Or, r> 0 implies the elasticity of H’s multinational
tax base does not decrease if F’s investment tends to reduce
the gross pretax profits in H.
ASSUMPTION 3. ||𝜓x|| ≥ ||𝜓∗x || and |||𝜓∗x∗ ||| ≥||𝜓x∗ ||.
Note that all of the above Assumptions hold
automatically in the LQ version of the model.
Equilibrium tax rates—obtained by solving
the reaction functions—depend on the levels
of public infrastructure governments invested in
period one and can be written as tN = tN(x, x*) and
t*N = t*N(x, x*). We restrict attention to unique
equilibria:
ASSUMPTION 4. For given infrastructural
investment levels, the tax equilibrium {tN(x, x*),
t*N(x, x*)} is unique.
To determine the effect of x on equilibrium
tax rates, we totally differentiate the first-order
conditions for welfare maximization and obtain:
(13a)
dtN
dx
=
W∗t∗xWtt∗ −W
∗
t∗t∗Wtx
Δ
and
(13b)
dt∗N
dx
=
WtxW
∗
t∗t −WttW
∗
t∗x
Δ
withΔ ≡ WttW∗t∗t∗ −W
∗
t∗tWtt∗ > 0, which follows
from Assumption 1.
PROPOSITION 1. Under noncooperative tax
setting, an increase in public infrastructure
increases the optimal tax in the investing country.
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Proof. See Appendix. ◾
Using the expressions for Wtx,Wtx∗ , W
∗
t∗x∗ and
W∗t∗x we can rewrite expression (13b) and the
analogous expression dtN /dx* as:
(14a) dt∗N∕dx = A
(
λ − λ
)
and
(14b) dtN∕dx∗ = A∗
(
λ∗ − λ
∗)
with A≡−r*BxWtt/Δ> 0, A∗ ≡ −rB∗x∗W
∗
t∗t∗∕Δ >
0, λ ≡
(
W∗t∗tR
)
∕
(
Wttr
∗)
, and λ
∗
=
(
Wtt∗R
∗)∕(
W∗t∗t∗r
)
. This gives us the following result.
PROPOSITION 2. Under noncooperative tax
setting, (a) an increase in public infrastructure
in Home increases (decreases) the optimal tax
in the Foreign country if λ > λ (λ < λ); (b)
an increase in public infrastructure in Foreign
increases (decreases) the optimal tax in Home if
λ∗ > λ
∗
(λ∗ < λ
∗
).
The critical externality levels, λ and λ
∗
, above
which an increase in public infrastructure raises
the rival location’s corporate tax, are negative
when taxes are strategic complements but pos-
itive when taxes are strategic substitutes. To
understand this intuitively, it is helpful to first
examine the special case in which Foreign’s
tax reaction function does not shift when Home
infrastructure changes (i.e., in the case that B*
is independent of x). Then, since an increase
in Home infrastructure shifts Home’s tax reac-
tion function to the right, it clearly raises the
Foreign tax if the Foreign reaction function
is upward sloping (W∗t∗t > 0), but reduces the
tax when the Foreign reaction function slopes
down (W∗t∗t < 0). Now, allow for the Foreign
reaction function to shift when Home infrastruc-
ture increases (i.e., in the case that B* directly
depends on x). When the cross-border externality
is positive, the Foreign reaction function shifts
out, working toward a higher Foreign tax. But,
if the externality is negative, the Foreign reac-
tion function shifts in, which works toward a
reduction in the tax. So, for an increase in Home
infrastructure not to increase the Foreign tax
when the Foreign reaction function is upward
sloping (i.e., W∗t∗t > 0) requires that the external-
ity be sufficiently negative; for it not to lead to
a decrease in the Foreign tax when the Foreign
reaction function slopes down (i.e., W∗t∗t < 0)
requires that the externality be positive enough.
In Section II, we discussed the fact that FDI
and public infrastructure can provide many ben-
efits in addition to tax revenue. We used G(t, t*,
x, x*) and G*(t, t*, x, x*) to capture these bene-
fits. Let us now briefly consider what difference
the inclusion of G and G* in the welfare func-
tions makes.
First, with Home welfare written in its
enhanced form as W = tB+G−Ω, the first-
order condition for the Home tax is now
tBt +B+Gt = 0. Hence, the optimal tax can
be written as t=−(B/Bt)− (Gt/Bt). We saw in
Section II that, when an increase in FDI has an
overall positive effect on the domestic economy,
Gt must be negative. A negative Gt works toward
a lower tax. The intuition is straightforward.
The government has additional reasons to attract
FDI and so has a stronger incentive to cut the
corporate tax rate. However, if there is a strong
enough crowding out effect of FDI on domestic
firms and the activity of these firms matters
enough to the government, Gt can change sign
and become positive. A positive Gt works toward
a higher corporate tax.
Second, there is a more subtle effect on the
strategic incentive to invest in public infrastruc-
ture. When additional benefits of FDI and public
infrastructure are taken into account, investment
in infrastructure could in some cases shift a
country’s tax reaction function inward rather
than outward. This would, however, only be
the case if Gtx is sufficiently negative such that
Wtx =Bx + tBtx +Gtx < 0 (Assumption 2 ensures
Bx + tBtx > 0). So, when would Gtx be nega-
tive? Intuitively, this could occur when public
infrastructure increases the nontax benefit to the
country of FDI. To see this, assume that Gt is
negative. If infrastructure makes FDI even more
useful to the country, then x tends to make Gt
even more negative (Gtx < 0). So, for instance,
a country with a more developed education sys-
tem may have a greater capacity to absorb and
make productive use of spillovers from foreign
multinationals. Such an “absorptive capacity”
effect thus works toward Gtx being negative.
If Gtx is sufficiently negative, then Wtx < 0 and
ψx < 0, thus working to reverse the strategic
incentive to invest in public infrastructure. For
instance, if taxes are strategic complements,
an increase in Home’s infrastructure works
toward a reduction in both taxes rather than an
increase.
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In the remainder of the article, we return to the
case in which G=G* = 0.
Stage 1: Investment in Public Infrastructure
under Tax Competition. We now determine the
countries’ optimal investment in infrastructure.
For ease of exposition we will focus on H’s
choice. F’s choice of investment is completely
analogous. The first-order condition for Home
welfare maximization is given by (6) with
Wt = 0 from the second stage. The first term in
expression (6), the direct effect of x on Home
welfare, is equal to Wx = tBx −Ω
′
. The sign of
the strategic term, the last term in expression (6),
determines whether the Home government will,
in order to manipulate the tax rates set in the rival
host country, over- or underinvest relative to the
hypothetical nonstrategic benchmark. Recall that
this benchmark was earlier defined in Section III
as the case in which governments choose public
infrastructure and tax rates at the same time,
implying that first-order conditions for x and
x*reduce to Wx = 0 and W∗x∗ = 0.
PROPOSITION 3. Under noncooperative tax
setting, the Home government will (a) strategi-
cally overinvest in public infrastructure relative
to the nonstrategic benchmark if dt*/dx> 0; (b)
strategically underinvest in public infrastruc-
ture relative to the nonstrategic benchmark if
dt*/dx< 0.
Proof. To determine which of these cases will
occur, we need to examine the strategic term in
detail. The term can be decomposed into Wt∗ and
dt*/dx. We have Wt∗ = tBt∗ > 0, implying that the
Foreign tax rate is “friendly,” which means that a
rise in Foreign’s tax rate increases Home welfare.
The sign of the strategic term therefore depends
on the sign of dt*/dx. ◾
B. Tax Cooperation
In this subsection, we restrict attention to sym-
metric countries.
ASSUMPTION 5. The countries are identical:
they have symmetric tax base functions and iden-
tical public infrastructure cost functions.
This assumption will facilitate a comparison
with the first best, which we will discuss in the
next section. The first-order condition for the
jointly optimal tax is given by expression (9),
with Wτ = W∗τ in a symmetric equilibrium and so
2Wτ = 0 (from expression (9)), implying Wτ = 0.
To compare the harmonized and nonharmonized
taxes, note that Wτ = 0 can be written as Wt +
Wt∗ = 0. As Wt∗ > 0, this implies Wt < 0, mean-
ing that, at given (symmetric) public infrastruc-
ture investment levels, the cooperative taxes are
higher than those under noncooperation.
In stage 1, the Home country chooses its pub-
lic infrastructural investment noncooperatively,
for which the first-order condition is given by
expression (11). As the equilibrium in public
infrastructure is symmetric, Wτ +W∗τ = 2Wτ = 0.
In turn, this implies Wx = 0 (from expression
(11)) and, as discussed in the previous section,
this means that investment is set according to the
nonstrategic simultaneous-move benchmark.
PROPOSITION 4. When countries are symmet-
ric, tax cooperation eliminates strategic invest-
ment in public infrastructure.
Thus, our findings in the LQ-case for tax
cooperation continue to hold with general func-
tional forms.
V. TAX COMPETITION VERSUS TAX COOPERATION:
A WELFARE COMPARISON
In this section, we compare welfare levels
under tax competition and tax cooperation. It is
a priori not certain that cooperative tax setting
alone will yield higher welfare levels than tax
competition since, even under tax cooperation,
countries set their infrastructure independently.
First, we show that tax cooperation typically does
not yield the “first-best” outcome. Second, we
determine the conditions under which tax com-
petition actually yields an outcome that is welfare
superior to the outcome under tax cooperation.
A. The First Best
The first-best outcome is reached when a
social planner, maximizing joint welfare of
Home and Foreign, decides on the tax rate and
each country’s investment in public infrastruc-
ture. This outcome is replicated by the countries
jointly setting both the tax rate and public infras-
tructure levels to maximize their joint welfare,
that is, when the countries cooperate on public
infrastructure and taxes. Assuming that the opti-
mization problem has a unique interior solution,
the first-order condition for the first-best tax is
given by expression (9), whereas the optimal
choice of infrastructure is given by:
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(15) Wx +W∗x = 0
where Wx =τBx −Ω
′
and W∗x = τB
∗
x . The follow-
ing proposition does not rely on special func-
tional forms.
PROPOSITION 5. With symmetric countries
the cooperative tax outcome coincides with the
first-best joint optimum only when λ= 0.
Proof. At λ= 0, W∗x = 0, which implies that
expression (15) is reduced to Wx = 0. In addi-
tion, the first-order condition for the first-best
tax is given by expression (9). Hence, at λ= 0,
both first-order conditions for the first best are
identical to those for the case with tax coopera-
tion alone. ◾
At the first best, unlike at the cooperative har-
monized tax equilibrium, each country’s pub-
lic infrastructural investment is chosen taking
full account of the external effect on the other
country’s welfare. Hence, tax cooperation alone
will not yield the first-best outcome when public
infrastructure investment generates cross-border
externalities. To attain the first best when there
are cross-border positive or negative externalities
would require the countries to not just cooperate
on taxes but to cooperate on public infrastructure
as well.27
B. Tax Competition Versus Tax Cooperation
We now show that the tax cooperation may
even yield a lower welfare level than tax com-
petition when one country’s public infrastruc-
ture investment generates externalities for the
other host country. Since a welfare compari-
son between tax cooperation and tax competition
requires specific functional forms, we use the LQ
version of our model.
In Figures 2A–C, we again depict the first-
order conditions for infrastructure and taxes in
symmetric (x,t)-space; these are now not only
shown for tax competition (xN(t) and tN(x)) and
for tax cooperation (xC(τ) and τC(x)), but also
for the first best (xO(τ) and τO(x)), where the
27. There are examples of cross-border cooperation on
particular public infrastructural projects of the type that gen-
erate positive international spillovers. Examples include the
United Kingdom, Belgium, and France cooperating on the
Eurostar train link, and Germany and Denmark cooperating
on the Fehmarnbelt tunnel to link the two countries. Examples
of infrastructural cooperation to limit cross border business
stealing are less evident.
first-best outcome is represented by point O. In
Figure 2A, there is no externality from public
infrastructure investment (λ= 0). In that case, as
shown by Proposition 5, tax cooperation actu-
ally yields the first-best outcome and hence the
first-best welfare level, whereas tax competition
clearly attains a lower welfare level (represented
by the fact that it lies on the WN-isowelfare
contour, with WN <WO). When there is an
externality, positive or negative, welfare under
tax cooperation always falls below the first-best
welfare level. Nevertheless, for positive exter-
nalities (λ> 0), tax cooperation always yields a
higher welfare level than tax competition, which
is illustrated in Figure 2B (WC >WN). However,
this is not always the case when the externality
is negative (λ< 0). Why is this so? With tax
cooperation equilibrium tax rates are higher than
with tax competition. This implies that levels of
public infrastructure investment are higher with
tax cooperation than with competition. However,
with each country investing in public infra-
structure that is harmful to the other host country,
the externality will lower welfare in each coun-
try. Furthermore, when investment in public
infrastructure is relatively effective (i.e., when η,
defined earlier as γ2/ω, is high), investment under
tax cooperation will be a lot higher than with tax
competition, thereby magnifying the negative
welfare effect of public infrastructure investment
on each country.
In the LQ case under tax competition,
the first-order condition for welfare max-
imization Wt =B+ tBt = 0 implies B=
−tBt =βtN . Also, since Wx = tγ−ωx,
Wt∗ = tβϵ, and dt*/dx= (2λ+ ϵ)γ/[β(4−ϵ2)]
in expression (6), we can write xN =
(η∕γ)
[
1 + 2ϵ
((
λ − λ
)
∕
(
4 − ϵ2
))]
tN . Hence,
each region’s welfare level under tax competition
is given by:
(16)
WN = β
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣
1−
η
2β
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 + 2ϵ
(
λ − λ
)
4−ϵ2
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
2⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦
(
tN
)2 =W∗N
with tN = t∗N = α
β(2−ϵ)−η(1+λ)
(
1+2ϵ λ−λ
4−ϵ2
) .
With tax cooperation and symmetric
countries, expression (9) implies 2Wτ = 0,
hence B=−τBτ = β(1−ϵ)τ. Furthermore,
Wx =τγ−ωx and dτ/dx= (1+λ)γ/[4β(1−ϵ)]
from expression (10). Hence, welfare in each
jurisdiction under tax cooperation is equal to:
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FIGURE 2
Tax Rates and Public Infrastructure Investment Levels: Tax Competition versus Cooperation—The
Symmetric Linear–Quadratic Case. (A) λ= 0, (B) λ> 0, and (C) λ < λ
(A)  λ = 0 (B) λ > 0 (C)  λ < λ
_
(17) WC = β
[
(1 − ϵ) − (η∕2β)
]
τ2 = W∗C
with τ=α/[2β(1−ϵ)−η(1+λ)].
Even in the LQ case, the welfare expres-
sions (expressions (16) and (17)) are not easy
to compare. It is helpful to illustrate the wel-
fare comparison diagrammatically. We use two
figures to do this. Figure 3A depicts welfare
under tax competition and tax cooperation (as
well as in the first best) as functions of λ. In the
diagram, when λ is sufficiently negative, welfare
under tax competition is higher than under tax
cooperation. Obviously, this diagram is drawn
for specific parameter values. While it is true that
when externalities from public infrastructure are
positive, tax cooperation always yields higher
welfare than tax competition, tax cooperation
does not necessarily give lower welfare than tax
competition when externalities are negative. In
fact, it is also necessary that, at the same time
as the externality being negative, the relative
effectiveness of public infrastructure (η) is high.
Figure 3B demonstrates this by showing welfare
under the three regimes (tax competition, tax
cooperation, and the first best) as a function of
η; note that in this figure λ< 0). At the threshold
η̃, welfare under tax competition and cooper-
ation are equal. For low levels of η (η < η̃),
tax cooperation generates higher welfare than
tax competition. However, for η-levels beyond
η̃ (η > η̃), the welfare level attained under tax
competition is higher than under tax cooperation.
PROPOSITION 6. In the LQ-case, there exists
a critical η-threshold, η̃ (λ), with (i) WC
(
η̃
)
=
WN
(
η̃
)
and (ii) dη̃∕dλ > 0.
Proof. See Appendix. ◾
VI. EXTENSIONS
This section briefly discusses some extensions
of the model.28 In the respective subsections, we
address what happens if the countries that are
contemplating tax harmonization were asymmet-
ric, we discuss the outcomes of the game if taxes
were chosen prior to infrastructure, we extend
our results to a setup with more than two juris-
dictions, and finally discuss what would happen
under an alternative form of tax harmonization.
A. Asymmetric Countries
So far, we assumed the countries involved
are symmetric. In this subsection, we discuss
the effects of tax cooperation when countries are
asymmetric.29
We introduce country asymmetry in the most
straightforward way, that is, by assuming that
one of the countries, Home, has, ceteris paribus,
a higher multinational tax base than Foreign,
which is captured in the LQ version of the model
by introducing a parameter α* in the tax base
function for Foreign, with α* < α. This could
be because Home has an underlying advantage
28. The formal analysis for these extensions is available
from the authors on request.
29. The existing literature has identified country asym-
metry as a potential reason why tax harmonization may reduce
welfare. Our model shows that, even when countries are sym-
metric, tax cooperation may lower welfare. Here, we show
that this result also holds when countries are asymmetric. This
is particularly true for the less attractive country.
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FIGURE 3
Welfare under Tax Cooperation and Tax Competition—The Symmetric Case. (A) Welfare and the
Externality, (B) Welfare and the Effectiveness of Public Infrastructure Investment
(A) Welfare and the externality (B) Welfare and the effectiveness of public        infrastructure investment
in attracting FDI. Henceforth, we will refer to
the “naturally more attractive” country as Home
for short. In the equilibrium with tax competi-
tion, Home will now charge a higher tax rate
than Foreign, while also investing more in pub-
lic infrastructure. When the countries cooperate
and set a common tax rate, τ, the common (har-
monized) tax rate is chosen to maximize the sum
of Home and Foreign welfare, W +W*. Welfare
is always higher in Home, that is, the country
that is “naturally more attractive” for FDI; so,
WN >W*N and WC >W*C. As in the case with
symmetric countries, whether a country gains or
loses from tax cooperation depends on the rela-
tive effectiveness of public infrastructure invest-
ment and on the level of the externality. When
the externality parameter is high, both coun-
tries gain from tax cooperation and will agree
to harmonize taxes. However, when the exter-
nality is sufficiently negative, tax cooperation
harms both countries and there will be no incen-
tive to set taxes cooperatively. For intermediate
externality levels, the “naturally more attractive”
country (Home) prefers tax cooperation to tax
competition, while the opposite is true for the
“naturally less attractive” country. This result
suggests that a peripheral, less developed country
may be less favorably disposed toward tax har-
monization than a core, highly developed country
that is more naturally attractive to FDI. In that
case, countries may wish to bargain over side-
payments to sustain tax cooperation.
B. Reversing the Move Order: Taxes before
Infrastructure
As we explained earlier, infrastructure is cho-
sen before taxes in our model because it is seen
as having more commitment value than taxes:
it involves a long-run decision and is to a large
extent irreversible. However, it is worth briefly
discussing what would happen in the alternative
case in which the sequence of decisions regarding
infrastructure and taxes is reversed.
If the sequence of decisions were reversed,
infrastructure would be chosen in stage 2, taking
the taxes as given. Clearly, there would no longer
be scope to use infrastructure to strategically
influence the tax rates of the other jurisdiction.
Home’s stage 2 first-order condition for infra-
structure would be given by Wx = 0. In stage 1,
taxes would be chosen taking account of any
effects that they would have on the future infra-
structural choice. In general, governments could
use taxes to strategically manipulate their rivals’
infrastructure. This effect cannot be definitely
signed in general, but it is zero in the linear
case. So, in the linear case, the noncooperative
outcome differs from that in our model in which
infrastructure is chosen before tax rates, because
of the absence of a strategic motive for infra-
structure, whereas the outcome under coopera-
tion is identical to that in our model.
C. Many Jurisdictions
So far, we have restricted attention to the
case of two jurisdictions. With n countries,
Equation (3a) and (3b) can be replaced by:
(18) Bi = α − β
(
ti − ϵT−i
)
+ γ
(
xi + λX−i
)
where Bi is a typical country i’s tax base, ti is its
tax rate, and xi is its infrastructure. Here, we write
T−i =Σj≠ itj and X−i =Σj≠ ixj. The welfare of
country i can be written as: Wi = tiBi − (ω∕2) x2i .
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From this we can derive country i’s second-
stage noncooperative equilibrium tax and the
effect of a country’s investment in public infra-
structure on another country’s corporate tax rate
(dtNj ∕dxi):
(19)
dtNj
dxi
= γ 2λ + ϵ
β (2 + ϵ) (2 − (n − 1) ϵ)
.
Expression (19) shows that, as in the two coun-
try case, the sign of the strategic term continues to
depend on whether λ is greater or smaller than the
critical value, −ϵ/2. Although it is the case that
the strategic effect of infrastructure is stronger
when each country is playing against more rival
jurisdictions, the addition of more countries
does not qualitatively affect this or the other
results.
D. Harmonized Minimum Tax Rates
We now consider an alternative form of tax
harmonization. Suppose taxes are constrained
not to fall below a minimum tax. Given this tax
floor, countries play a noncooperative two-stage
game, setting infrastructure in stage 1 and taxes
in stage 2. When the minimum tax rate is higher
than tN , the equilibrium tax rate in each region is
τM . There is then no longer any need to choose
public infrastructure investment levels strategi-
cally as the legally imposed minimum tax rate
effectively pushes the tax rates beyond the level
that would prevail when governments are uncon-
strained in choosing taxes. This implies that
one can expect a minimum tax, if effective, to
increase investment in public infrastructure when
the latter generates a sufficiently negative cross-
border externality (λ < λ, in which case there is
an incentive to underinvest in public infrastruc-
ture in the absence of a minimum tax). When
public infrastructure generates a cross-border
externality that is above a critical threshold level
(i.e., λ > λ), the minimum tax rate eliminates
the strategic incentive to overinvest in public
infrastructure, which works toward a lower level
of infrastructure. However, the tax floor now
ensures a higher tax rate and since the public
infrastructure investment level is itself increasing
in the tax rate, there is a countervailing effect
on the infrastructure level that works toward
increasing it. When the minimum tax is suffi-
ciently high, this second effect dominates and the
infrastructure is higher than in the noncooperative
case.
VII. CONCLUSION
A country’s ability to attract inward FDI
depends, among other things, on corporate tax
rates and on the level and quality of local public
infrastructure. Since a potential host country
can attract more FDI by increasing its invest-
ment in public infrastructure, the multinational
firm component of its tax base thus depends in
part on the level of local public infrastructure.
Moreover, public infrastructural investment in
one country can also affect the attractiveness and
hence the multinational tax base of a competing
host country, and may do so either positively
or negatively.
To study these issues, we have constructed
a two-country model of corporate tax competi-
tion for inward FDI, in which governments also
invest in public infrastructure. When the exter-
nality generated by one country’s investment in
public infrastructure is above a critical thresh-
old level, governments strategically increase their
investment in infrastructure in order to raise the
rival host country’s corporate tax rate. This soft-
ens tax competition and therefore benefits the
investing host country indirectly. However, if the
externality is below that critical threshold (for
instance as a result of a strong business steal-
ing effect), then the strategic effect of public
infrastructure is negative and the investing coun-
try has an incentive to lower its public infrastruc-
ture investment.
The external effect of public infrastructure
on the other country also affects the gains from
tax harmonization. Although tax cooperation can
raise the welfare of countries, we have found
that—even when countries are symmetric—this
is not always the case. In fact, when infrastruc-
ture is sufficiently cost effective in enhancing a
country’s attractiveness and hence in raising its
own tax base while generating a sufficiently large
negative cross-border externality, then tax coop-
eration, without infrastructure coordination, actu-
ally reduces welfare. The reason for this lies in
the fact that, although resulting in higher equi-
librium taxes and hence avoiding a race to the
bottom in tax rates, tax cooperation also leads to
higher investment in public infrastructure. When
countries coordinate taxes but not infrastructure,
they ignore the business stealing negative exter-
nality that their infrastructure imposes on other
countries and they engage in excessive (mutually
damaging) investment. When this effect is strong
enough, tax cooperation results in lower welfare
levels than tax competition.
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Our results are cautionary as they imply that
policymakers may inadvertently make matters
worse by signing up to tax harmonization pro-
grams without consideration of regional public
infrastructure investment schemes. Specifically,
it provides policymakers of competing jurisdic-
tions who consider tax harmonization with a rule
of thumb. If tax cooperation, which is the form of
tax harmonization that leads to the highest wel-
fare at given infrastructure levels when countries
are very similar, actually reduces welfare below
the level attained with tax competition, then alter-
native forms of tax harmonization cannot be
expected to raise welfare levels either. We found
that, when rival host jurisdictions experience
very negative cross-border spillovers from each
other’s public infrastructure investment projects,
policymakers should be most wary of any form
of tax harmonization. By contrast, if cross-border
spillovers from public infrastructure investment
are positive, or negative but small, our model sug-
gests that in those circumstances tax harmoniza-
tion is more likely to bear fruit.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1. Under noncooperative tax setting, an
increase in public investment increases the optimal tax in
the investing country. Here, we will examine the case of the
Home country.
From dt
N
dx
=
W∗
t∗xWtt∗−W
∗
t∗ t∗Wtx
Δ , we know that the sign depends
on that of the numerator since Δ> 0 from Assumption 1. To
determine the sign of the numerator, note that the derivative
W∗t∗t∗ is negative from the second-order condition for the
foreign country and Wtx is positive from Assumption 2. So,
it is the case that −W∗t∗t∗Wtx > 0. This leads us to consider
4 cases:
Case (1): Wtt∗ > 0 (taxes are strategic complements) and
W∗t∗x ≥ 0 (public infrastructure generates a non-negative
cross-border externality).
Case (2): Wtt∗ < 0 (taxes are strategic substitutes) and
W∗t∗x ≤ 0 (public infrastructure generates a nonpositive
cross-border externality).
Case (3): Wtt∗ > 0 (taxes are strategic complements) and
W∗t∗x ≤ 0 (public infrastructure generates a nonpositive cross-
border externality).
Case (4): Wtt∗ < 0 (taxes are strategic substitutes) and
W∗t∗x ≥ 0 (public infrastructure generates a nonnegative
cross-border externality).
It is clear that dtN /dx is guaranteed to be positive in cases
(1) and (2) above as then W∗t∗xWtt∗ ≥ 0, which reinforces
−W∗t∗t∗Wtx > 0. It remains to be shown that dt
N /dx is also pos-
itive in cases (3) and (4). In case (3), Assumption 3, which
states ||ψx|| ≥ ||ψ∗x ||, implies −Wtx∕Wtt ≥ W∗t∗x∕W∗t∗t∗ > 0
and so Wtx ≥ −Wtt
(
W∗t∗x∕W
∗
t∗t∗
)
> 0. Hence, the numer-
ator −W∗t∗t∗Wtx +W
∗
t∗xWtt∗ is at least as large as
Wtt
(
W∗t∗x∕W
∗
t∗t∗
)
W∗t∗t∗ +W
∗
t∗xWtt∗ = W
∗
t∗x
(
Wtt +Wtt∗
)
> 0
since the term in brackets is negative from Assumption 1.
Hence, we conclude dtN∕dx =
(
W∗t∗xWtt∗ −W
∗
t∗t∗Wtx
)
∕Δ >
0. Next, consider case (4). Now, Assumption 3, which
states ||ψx|| ≥ ||ψ∗x ||, implies −Wtx∕Wtt ≥ −W∗t∗x∕W∗t∗t∗ > 0
and so Wtx ≥ Wtt
(
W∗t∗x∕W
∗
t∗t∗
)
> 0. Hence, the numer-
ator −W∗t∗t∗Wtx +W
∗
t∗xWtt∗ is at least as large as
−W∗t∗x
(
Wtt −Wtt∗
)
> 0 since the term in brackets is
negative from Assumption 1.
Analogous derivations can be used to show dt*N /dx* > 0.
Proof of Proposition 6. The threshold η̃ is defined by
WN
(
η̃
)
= WC
(
η̃
)
. Using expressions (16) and (17), we
obtain the following quadratic function in η̃:
(A1) Vη̃2 + Zη̃ + E = 0
with V ≡−2(1+λ)[(1−ϵ)(1−λ)S2 − (2−ϵ)S+ (1+λ)],
Z ≡ 4(1−ϵ)2S2 + 4(1−ϵ)(1+λ)[2− (2−ϵ)S]− (2−ϵ)2,
E ≡ 2(1−ϵ)ϵ2, and S ≡ 1 + 2ϵ
(
λ − λ
)/(
4 − ϵ2
)
. Solving
expression ((A1)) for η̃, selecting the relevant root, yields
η̃ = −
(
Z +
√
Z2 − 4VE
)
∕2V > 0.
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